

On Rorty's idea of Human solidarity

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Abstract: Rorty's idea of human solidarity is an important part of his utopian vision. Solidarity is a component of moral progress and social progress, a value goal pursued by humanity, and a powerful force to overcome difficulties. The realization of solidarity does not lie in a leaning toward a certain metaphysical standard, it lies in moral progress and social progress, i.e. the hope of society. Moral progress is indeed a movement towards greater human solidarity. The "moral brass law" of global ethical principles adds rational factors and realization paths to moral progress.

1. Introduction

At the end of 2019, the novel coronavirus pneumonia epidemic broke out worldwide. According to World Health Organization statistics on November 2, 2021: 262,178,403 new coronavirus cases were confirmed worldwide, with 5,215,745 deaths. The spread and repetition of the epidemic has blocked communication between countries and regions, with people falling ill and suffering the pain of losing loved ones. The global economy also suffered severe shocks, with businesses closing down and a sharp increase in unemployment, shattering the stable and balanced world. In the face of trauma, separation, death, confrontation, turmoil and division, human solidarity is particularly important. In 2020, China will win the battle against poverty in an all-round way. China's comprehensive victory in the battle against poverty in 2020, when all rural poor people will be removed from poverty, is precisely what has reduced the trauma and cruelty caused to people by poverty. And the implementation of the comprehensive rural revitalization strategy creates more opportunities for the Chinese people to progress and create a better future.

Solidarity is defined by Modern Chinese Dictionary as "to unite or combine in order to concentrate efforts on a common ideal or task; to work together, to combine closely; to be in harmony". The English-Chinese Dictionary interprets "Solidarity" as "unity; common agreement; association, relatedness". Solidarity, therefore, is the spiritual expression of relying on the gathering of multiple emotions to unite to accomplish a common goal. John Rawls's theory of Justice is based on the theme of social justice [1] which is also the core of his idea of a harmonious society. From the perspective of social justice, the possibility of achieving a social order of equality, freedom, fraternity, and harmony that Rawls is thinking about reflects precisely the issue of human solidarity. Jürgen Habermas' view of solidarity states, pointing out all unite to take responsibility for each other, "he's solidarity, so that he's become one of us, show us the flexibility It forms a commsolidarity that resists all practical limitations and expands the traversable boundary further." [2] At the beginning of "Solidarity" in Chapter 9 of "Contingency, Irony and Solidarity", Rorty used the example of Jews to show that what he called solidarity was "human solidarity", that is, a sense of human solidarity, which is "A common good and politics that transcends self-interest." [3]

In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty outlines the image of a "liberal ironist" and constructs a utopia of "Ironic Liberty". In the liberal ironic utopia, people no longer believe that a common humanity that transcends history can be found as the basis for human solidarity; human solidarity is not discovered through theoretical research, but created in a new description of others and self. After ironing the metaphysical foundation of human solidarity, Rorty conceived a plan to alleviate the contradiction between the public and private spheres, so that individuals and society have opportunities

and hopes for progress, making human solidarity possible, and moral progress and social progress are indeed towards a broader The solidarity and development of mankind.

In the social public sphere, human solidarity is the goal of liberal utopia; in making liberalism and ironicism compatible, solidarity is the process and means by which liberal utopia can be realized. Constantly expand the scope of "we", let more people see hope, make society progress continuously, create greater solidarity, and realize solidarity in the sense of mankind. Rorty's solidarity thought is an important part of his liberal ironic utopia conception, and it is the ultimate goal of liberalism, and it has the characteristics of ironicism.

2. Rorty's solidarity thought

"Human solidarity", "In the traditional philosophical way of stating it, it is the affirmation that each of us has something within us - our essential humanity - and that this echoes the same thing that others have. This way of explaining the concept of solidarity is in fact consistent with what we are used to saying " [4] " Inhuman " refers to "a certain basic ingredient that lacks a complete human being" [5] The above-mentioned philosophical tradition, represented by Plato and Kant, takes the essence of man as the metaphysical basis of human solidarity, which implies the achievement of human solidarity through the use of reason to discover a common essence.

Rorty's idea of solidarity, in the universal sense of all humanity, is the opposite of traditional Western philosophy. He asserts that "no such component exists at all, and there is no such thing as a core self". After the triple contingency argument of language, self and liberal society, Rorty insists on contingency and rejects essence and foundation, arguing that solidarity is contingent and has different degrees, and that human solidarity is about the greatest degree of solidarity of all humanity, an ever-expanding solidarity.

Malesvic suggests that "micro-solidarity is not necessarily based on physical or cultural similarities, but on strong emotional ties and rational value bonds. In this sense, micro-solidarity is a prerequisite for all solidarity and ultimately helps to ensure our survival as human beings. We as human beings all tend to seek comfort, ontological security, meaning, warmth and emotional solace through our interactions with individuals we value and care about." [6] The concept of "micro-solidarity", with its emphasis on emotional ties and its focus on individual interaction, is very similar to Rorty's idea of moral progress, which is the process of developing solidarity. Solidarity means that people are able to see that more and more traditional differences (tribal, religious, ethnic, customary, etc.) are insignificant compared to their similarities in terms of pain and humiliation. The similarity of people in terms of pain and humiliation is an emotional bond that emphasizes solidarity. Similarities in terms of pain and humiliation are what create the emotional bond that people have. "By drawing their attention to the innumerable small commonalities that exist between them, rather than by stating some great commonality, their common humanity." [7] Rorty's solidarity thus takes on the meaning of micro-solidarity, reflecting its repeated emphasis on avoiding transcending history and institutions and achieving solidarity step by step through emotions and the small commonalities.

In a political sense, according to Zhang Guoqing, "Solidarity is a power struggle or a political game strategy. Solidarity is a strategy dedicated to customer service divisions, splits, confrontations and rebellious tendencies, preserving and strengthening one's own strength and combating and dismantling hostile forces." [8] In this sense, solidarity cannot be all-encompassing. For Rorty, solidarity is the theme and the goal. "Whenever I use the word 'solidarity' I mean that others and we are 'self-family'." [9] When he speaks of solidarity, he always treats the other as someone who has not yet become "us" and does not take into account the element of hostility, suggesting that Rorty is not content with small-scale solidarity and that there is no such role as "enemy" in his perspective. (In a democratic society and in times of peace, this idea could be understood and accepted, but the absence of this perspective is also a problem for Rorty's idea of solidarity, as will be discussed later).

In a social sense, solidarity means both the friendly treatment of individuals by others and the social responsibility and commitment of individuals. Solidarity is about treating others as if they were our own family, expanding our sense of "we". As Rorty says, "Always be aware of the marginalized people

- the people we still instinctively attribute to 'them' rather than to 'us'. those we still instinctively attribute to 'them' rather than to 'us'".[10] It is our kindness and respect for others, even marginalised individuals, that we have a moral obligation to feel a sense of solidarity with others, which reflects our sense of social responsibility. Although Rorty does not envisage us as 'the marginalized people', in such a society the marginal 'I' will also be treated kindly by the other. Rorty draws a line between the private and the public spheres, where the friendly treatment includes respect for the need for self-creation and the pursuit of private perfection as individuals. "The division of labour brings together the different individuals in society and provides the order, harmony and social solidarity necessary for society." [11] The harmony embedded in a united society gives the private sphere the opportunity to develop and the individual is able to be free from the oppression of others and society; at the same time the individual has a public responsibility and we will treat others kindly. In a social sense, Rorty's idea of solidarity emphasizes our tolerance of the other, which is our public responsibility, while encompassing the idea that the private sphere of the individual should be respected.

In an ethnic and cultural sense, solidarity is "a phenomenon of specific cultural and ethnic identity" [12] Rorty sees his view as ethnocentric or anti-ethnocentric. In line with Sellars' claim that "we have no other obligations than the 'we-intentions' of the communities with which we identify" [13] Rorty takes the view that we are bound by The "validity of the interacting subject" determines the effective range of the referent, and there is a sense of solidarity and obligation to the groups formed by this range because we are part of these groups, large and small. Rorty argues that no one can have the kind of identity that "believes that the largest such group is 'human' or 'all rational beings'" [14] in losing the assumption of the rational nature of humanity, solidarity ceases to be a fact and is created. Rorty shows that the solution to the ills of ethnocentrism lies not in the recognition of a common human essence, but in the fact that, as ethnocentrists, "'we' are committed to expanding ourselves and creating larger and more complex and diverse peoples." [15]

Rorty believes in "moral progress", and the direction of progress is the direction of broader human solidarity. From countless small commonalities to the greater solidarity of all mankind, solidarity is the ever-expanding scope of "we", and finally achieves the goal of human solidarity.

"The slogan 'We have a duty to all men simply because they are men' is rightly interpreted as a means of reminding us to expand our sense of 'we' as much as possible at all times. That slogan calls us to continue in the direction set by past deeds: to expand the 'we' to the family in the next cave, then to the tribe on the other side of the river, then to the confederacy of tribes beyond the mountains, then to the pagans beyond the seas (and, perhaps, finally to all the slaves, which category of people doing menial work for us from beginning to end)." [16]

At this point we are no longer concerned with the solidarity of certain groups, but with the solidarity of humanity. Rorty tries to point out that "whether human solidarity is an identification with 'all humanity itself' or a form of self-doubt, we must distinguish sharply." [17] When one has what Rorty calls "the ability to separate the question of whether you and I share an ultimate language from the question of whether you are suffering" [18] we will be able to distinguish between the public and private spheres, making freedom and irony possible at the same time, and naturally achieving human solidarity. In this, one can see Rorty's concern for the whole of humanity, his desire to resolve the contradiction between public and private issues, combining liberalism and irony, and human solidarity as the goal of his utopian society, a better future that Rorty envisages for humanity.

3. Reasons for human solidarity

Rorty's solidarity has the premise of dividing the public and private spheres, and solidarity belongs to the public sphere, not personal affairs.

After Descartes's "I think, therefore I am", only "my thoughts" can be identified by me. "I" cannot identify others like "I". When talking about "us", more reasons are needed. Rorty's solidarity is to constantly regard them as one of us. Before considering others as a member of "us", it is necessary to explain in what sense "we" can be used.

Rorty uses the word "we" extensively in "Contingency, Irony and Solidarity", and the meaning of the word "we" varies in many ways. "We" can become "us" because "I" and other members identify with "us". This kind of identification comes from the consensus reached by conversation or the similarities between members, rather than from the universal commonality of human beings. In the philosophical context, the "us" Rorty identified as us pragmatists; from the political perspective, the "us" Rorty identified as Western liberal intellectuals.

In "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature", Rorty argues that a consensus derived from the ultimate language as a basis for solidarity leads to the dehumanization of humanity. There is no metaphysical basis for solidarity; it is the willingness to talk, to persuade in place of violence. Solidarity is the willingness to hear others speak the language of others and to be able to speak one's own language oneself. The philosopher's effort is to keep the conversation going so that we speak our own reasons and listen to others speaking the language of others. Solidarity is justified by our willingness to talk and our rejection of cruelty and violence.

Rorty's pragmatism manifests itself in the public political sphere as ethnocentrism or anti-anti-ethnocentrism. Rorty argues that there is no community that includes all of humanity, and that "the contrast of our power should essentially lie in its contrast with the sweetness - the wrong humanity - of some other human being." [19] In Rorty's pragmatic view of truth, identification with 'us' cannot come from a metaphysical foundation, and the defence of 'us' lies in 'our' ways of life and traditions. [20] The ideal that 'we' pursue is therefore local and culturally relevant. Rorty draws from Sellars's 'we-intentional' moral imperative that the fundamental interpretive concept in the realm of moral imperatives is 'one of us'. The moral criterion is not rooted in metaphysics, but in the identification of "us" with "we", "I" as "one of us". "One of us. Rorty's ethnocentrism implies that social and political progress has recourse to local practices and standards, which is a liberal democratic society to Rorty.

In an ethnocentric stance, why should we feel a sense of solidarity with all other human beings, beyond identifying with the 'we' I live in? Rorty argues that a sense of solidarity depends on which similarities and differences are most significant to us. As liberals, "we" are most afraid of being cruel. To be deprived of the opportunity to speak one's own language is undoubtedly a cruel thing. Ethnocentrism does not mean selfishness and self-imposed isolation. Rorty believes that it is possible for "us" to accept the other, that it is possible for us to communicate with them, that we can "weave" them into our existing beliefs, and that in the process they become us. The sense of solidarity that we should have with all other human beings therefore comes from our preference for peaceful persuasion rather than violence in order to reach agreements and accomplish common goals. Solidarity means being aware that the differences of a growing number of traditions are insignificant compared to the similarities between people in terms of suffering and humiliation [21].

4. Ways to achieve solidarity

Achieving solidarity does not lie in a leaning towards some metaphysical standard, it lies in moral progress and social progress, i.e. the hope of society.

Darwin's theory of evolution was a great revelation to Rorty. Darwin believed that more complex species, better adapted to environmental change, were superior, that such complexity did not have an absolute criterion, and that their evolution had no goal or purpose, but was distinguished by merit. Accordingly, Rorty argued that progress was not a matter of getting closer to a pre-determinable goal, but of being able to solve more problems, and that the measure of progress was that we made ourselves better people than we had been in the past.

"Making us a better person" means less cruelty and more opportunities. The hope of social progress lies in that we can learn from our own and the past of our grandfathers and do better than before. We only need to know the current degree of freedom and cruelty. We don't need to know how to achieve truth, unconditionality, universality or transcendence. This kind of hope is the common hope of all mankind. Therefore, Rorty believes that the direction of social progress is human solidarity.

Social progress is manifested in less cruelty and more opportunities. This is the characteristic of Rorty's path to achieve solidarity. Rorty believes that the realization of solidarity requires narration to replace theory, literature to replace philosophy; dialogue to replace hostility, and persuasion to replace violence.

Achieving solidarity requires that humans have "less cruelty". Rorty draws Judith Shklar's idea of 'putting cruelty first', agreeing with her view of liberals as those who believe that 'cruelty is the worst thing we can do'. "Cruelty can suffer [22] Cruelty can lead to humiliation, bring violence, hatred, etc. Solidarity is obviously difficult to achieve in societies where suffering and humiliation are frequent. Therefore, achieving solidarity requires that human beings suffer less from cruelty. As an ironist, Rorty argues that the reduction of cruelty should not be supported by the common nature of human beings, but should resort to such small, concrete questions as where cruelty occurs and what causes human suffering, and should increase people's moral sensitivity to cruelty and their compassion for the suffering of others. Metaphysical arguments for a fundamental, common humanity not only fail to increase our sensitivity to cruelty, but they also leave us with little sense of the suffering of others who are far from us or close to us. Theoretical arguments cannot unite individual Self-realization with social solidarity. Accordingly, Rorty proposes to abandon theoretical argumentation and turn to narrative, to re-establish the relationship between philosophy and literature, and to replace philosophy with literature in moral progress and social progress.

Moving away from theoretical arguments and towards narrative. While philosophers tend to see theory first and narrative second, literary scholars are able to express detail and emotion in narrative. Reading Dostoevsky's novels, watching journalists' news reports on the war, watching documentaries about the Holocaust, can increase one's perception of the suffering of others, heighten one's moral sensitivity to cruelty, connect 'us' to 'them', and make "us" see "their" suffering as our own, constantly accepting "them" as "us" The sense of human solidarity is thus created. The condition for this transmission is the human imagination and compassion. Through literary narratives, we are able to use our imagination to put ourselves in "their" situation and suffering, to imagine strangers as my own people. In narratives such as fiction, journalism and documentaries, our imagination is constantly enhanced by the subtlety and precision with which literary writers, journalists and photographers capture details and emotions.

Respect for the use of one's own vocabulary by others. By replacing philosophy with literature, the argumentation and the search for essence and truth favored by philosophers is replaced by the narrative of the novel, in which novelists portray diverse worlds from different perspectives and absolute truth is abolished. Under the narrative approach, each person has the right to express his or her unique side. Rorty introduces from Elaine Scully's argument that one of the worst things we can do to another person is to disintegrate his world, making it impossible for him to use words to describe what she does and is.[23] To make it impossible for her to have a self. To deprive another of the right to use his own vocabulary is insulting, painful and cruel. Literature here, however, can be less cruel, giving it the right to express its own understanding of the world, and it embraces pluralism so that we can pay attention to listen to and respect the use of its vocabulary by others.

After argumentation turns to narrative and literature replaces philosophy, philosophy no longer has the function of laying the foundation for culture. Rorty restricts philosophy to the private realm, making it play a role in helping us create ourselves and achieve personal perfection. Philosophy is only a private matter, not restricted by public affairs, and no longer guides public affairs. In the private field, philosophy, as a kind of literature, makes us constantly ironic our own ultimate vocabulary, make our own vocabulary continue to develop, and finally achieve personal perfection. With its limitless tolerance, literature provides resources for continuous self-creation and transformation of its ultimate language, which enables literature to play a central role in moral education. In the world created by fictional narratives, people's horizons are broadened, and they continue to reflect and improve. From this perspective, literature and narrative not only reduce the cruelty of human society, but also provide opportunities for personal creation and progress. Self-creation requires not only personal effort and ideological resources, but also the tolerance of the social environment. This is another key point of solidarity, that is, "more opportunities."

Rorty argues that "the social cement that binds the ideal liberal society together is nothing more than a consensus - a belief that the purpose of social organization is to give each individual the opportunity to use his or her abilities to the fullest in self-creation" [24] That is, society should create more opportunities for individual self-realization, such as tolerance of diversity of thought, giving individuals the ground for their ideas to exist and develop. In Rorty's view, better individual self-creation is related to the enjoyment of more education, security, leisure, etc. Those who are considered to be inhuman only because they lack good education and living environment, if they can be given more education and good living environment, provide more opportunities for individual self-creation, negotiate in a democratic environment, reach consensus and make solidarity possible, they will become the same as us People.

Although the above is only intra-territorial solidarity, the moral progress of humanity moves in a broader direction and it becomes possible to move from territorial solidarity to human solidarity. To this end, Rorty advocates dialogue instead of hostility and persuasion instead of violence. Although Rorty's solidarity is ethnocentric, and the sense of 'our' solidarity is only real and strong when 'we' exist on a smaller scale than humans, this does not mean that 'we' are in opposition to 'them'. "In opposition to 'them'". The common human feeling of suffering is much greater than the traditional differences between 'us' and 'them'. We should try to expand our sense of 'us' and come to see 'them' as one of 'us'. This requires us to avoid hostility and exclusion when dealing with the other, and to increase our sense of identity with them through dialogue and consensus building. Dialogue and communication between regions is based on consensus, and the process of "we" constantly accepting "them" as us is a process of persuasion in dialogue, which is peaceful, gradual and progressive, not violent. Violence is cruel; it is not acceptance and inclusion, but subjugation, and cannot create a sense of solidarity. Dialogue and persuasion require recourse to the compassion and imagination mentioned earlier. Understanding the other through dialogue and using our imagination in the process of getting to know them allows us to imagine "them" as one of "us" and to constantly strengthen the sense of human solidarity.

5. Evaluation of Rorty's Solidarity Thought

Rorty's moral progress lies in the expansion of the 'we', in our constant acceptance of others as part of the 'we' through compassion. Moral progress is interpreted as the constant transformation of them into us, with the presupposition that others want to be us, without taking into account that others do not want to be us [25] Rorty is ethnocentric, and it is only in our tradition that reasonable and objective criteria can be found. In this sense, Rorty's human solidarity is not a progress but only an expansion.

Rorty's moral progress requires not only 'our' acceptance of 'others' but also 'their' identification with 'us'. "Their integration into us and their acceptance by us means that they need to learn our ultimate language, during which their original ultimate language is subjected to irony, making it impossible for people to speak their own language, which is insulting, cruel and incompatible with a liberal society. Rorty argues that Western democratic and liberal societies are better societies, and he argues against metaphysics providing a basis for politics, morality, etc. Although he does not address this on a metaphysical level, he gives reasons for human solidarity and freedom. Nevertheless, such reasons may be the language of the "we" to which Rorty belongs, rather than the language of all people. It is only by presupposing that we are better than they are that they may be willing to become one of us, even if they remain unwilling. Beyond this, there are two other cases. One is that "they" are equal to "us", and the other is that "they" are better than "we". In both cases they will not want to be us.

Rorty's moral progress is thus incompatible with his ethnocentrism, as well as with his ironism. Rorty avoids totalitarianism in a liberal society with irony, arguing that the ultimate language will only be internally circular, that the language of irony must not be "our" ultimate language, but only "our" creation of a new discourse, or from "The ultimate language of "them" will be an important source of irony for "us".[26] On this basis, we are not to constantly accept them as one of us, but to treat them as having the same status as one of us, accepting them as one of us if they want to be included, and accepting them as a reasonable situation if they do not want to be included.

Some critics see Rorty's solidarity as typically Western-centric and self-supremacist, and therefore inevitably relativistic and dangerously ethnocentric. Rorty defends this by distinguishing between harmful and harmless ethnocentrism and relativism. He sees himself as moderate ethnocentrism and harmless relativism as pragmatism. In Rorty's view "loyalty to our own practices is compatible with acceptance of difference and tolerance of pluralism, and is not incompatible with his advocacy of solidarity - acceptance of difference and understanding, tolerance of pluralism." [27] Rorty's solidarity, therefore, is not entirely about their integration into us, but also about our intermingling with them.

After this explanation, Rorty's idea of solidarity remains problematic in addressing the 'us' and 'them' relationship. Rorty's moral progress resorts to compassion, which remains inadequate to address the issue of us versus them. When Rorty's solidarity is no longer about the strong position of "us" and the weak position of "them", and "they" want to integrate into "us" "they" want to fit into "us" and we need to accommodate them, such a simple presupposition implies an intermingling of "us" and "them", when sympathy can only provide the basis for the former kind of solidarity, but not for It does not provide the means for "intermingling" to take place. The word sympathy carries with it a sense of compassion for 'them' on the part of 'us', while communion requires respect for 'them' on the part of 'us'. Respect for "them". Although 'they' are different from 'us', they deserve our respect and the right to speak their own language, a respect that is consistent with Rorty's liberalism. Rorty's definition of liberals, borrowed from Judith Sklar, is that liberals are those who believe that 'cruelty is the worst thing we can do'. [28] Fear of cruelty is the bottom line of Rorty's liberalism, and the real emotions that people feel about suffering are the myriad small commonalities that people have that give them the capacity for compassion. In this, Rorty reveals that compassion is a prerequisite for solidarity and that emotional progress is the way to moral progress.

The solidarity based on sympathy is fragile. Compassion only solves the reasons and ways for "we" to accept "others", and to achieve integration, more connections between "us" and "them" are needed. At this level, the author believes that Huang Yong's "Copper rule" as a global ethical principle is not inconsistent with Rorty's solidarity, and is a supplement to Rorty's solidarity thought.

Firstly, as an anti-essentialist, Rorty repeatedly stressed the need to avoid what transcends history and institutions. [29] He denied the existence of a supposedly common human nature, opposed the identification of transcendent metaphysical foundations of morality, and rejected the criterion of morality as being closer to the 'essence of human nature'. He therefore rejects Kantian moral principles. The Copper Rule is not a Kantian moral principle, but is presented as a global ethical principle in place of the Golden Rule. One of the inherent problems with the Golden Rule is that it presupposes the commonality and similarity of human beings. [30] The Copper Rule does not have such presuppositions and does not proceed from a metaphysical human nature; it is a universal argument for the ethical character of the global age, not a transcendental metaphysical foundation. That the Copper Rule is universal as a moral principle is not contradictory to Rorty's anti-essentialism and does not contradict Rorty's anti-ironic qualities.

Secondly, there is no contradiction between the Copper Rule and Rorty's liberalism. Rorty's liberalism is reflected in the bottom line of 'no cruelty' and the goal of 'human solidarity' [31] The Copper Rule is clearly compatible with it, and helps to avoid cruelty. The moral copper law emphasises the wishes of the object of action as a criterion for the justification of action, avoiding the possibility that the actor may reasonably impose his wishes on the object of action. This is the negative narrative of the Copper Rule of Morality, i.e. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you". There is also a positive narrative of the Copper Rule of morality: 'Do to others what you would have them do to you'. The positive narrative of the Copper Rule implies a demand for the understanding of others when the subject of the action and the object of the action have different desires [32] Rorty argues that human solidarity is a human consensus, and that human solidarity is created, not discovered. Understanding of the other facilitates consensus. Rorty appeals solidarity to the common human feeling of suffering, to our sensitivity to their suffering. The demand for understanding of others includes the demand that we increase our sensitivity to the suffering of others, and that in order to alleviate the suffering of others we cannot limit ourselves to "doing unto others as we would have them do unto us", but also require the positive action of "doing unto others as we would have them do unto

us", so that we empathise with the suffering of others We therefore need to empathise with the suffering of others as a requirement for right action under the brass tacks of morality. With regard to Rorty's view that human solidarity is not based on reason, the moral law does not start from our own reason and does not appeal to objective criteria that are neutral outside the subject and object of the action, but from the true feelings of others.

Thirdly, the Copper Rule is not in contradiction with Rorty's ethnocentrism. The Copper Rule's characteristic of starting with the other seems to make us lose our own traditions and positions, but understanding the other does not mean abandoning our own traditions. [33] As mentioned earlier, the process of turning them into us requires not only our acceptance but also their willingness, otherwise it tends to become the assimilation of the strong into the weak. How to know "their" will requires us to understand others from their point of view. It is in understanding others that we can come to terms with them, discovering the countless small commonalities between us and them, so that we and they can see differences as morally irrelevant. For them to have different aspirations from ours, which we only respect and do not hinder, does not mean that I give up my own. This also fits in with Rorty's claim that diversity should be allowed in a liberal society.

The Copper Rule does not contradict Rorty's ironism and liberalism; the Copper Rule can complement Rorty's ideas of solidarity and moral progress.

Firstly, the voice of others is an important source of irony for us, and we need to respect others to enrich ourselves through them and to enable us to make moral progress [34] This enrichment cannot be achieved through compassion alone; the Copper Rule contains the spirit of understanding others and provides us with the path to enrich us and achieve moral progress.

Secondly, Rorty's constant expansion of them into us, imagining the stranger as a fellow sufferer, presupposes the kindness and weakness of the stranger and the willingness of the other to integrate into us. On the one hand it tends to lead to the cruelty produced by the assimilation of the strong into the weak, and on the other to the consideration of the other as an enemy, which may make us dangerous [35] this problem can be mitigated by adding the Copper Rule to the moral principles of its liberal society. The Copper Rule does not presuppose the will of the object of the act, and therefore not the good will of others. When others threaten us and do not respect our wishes, it is clear that they are immoral. The Copper Rule's requirement of understanding of others before acting also offers us the possibility of detecting the malice of others.

Thirdly, Rorty's solidarity and moral progress resorts to emotional progress, and the lack of rational pursuits tends to lead to extreme emotions; solidarity linked by emotion is fragile. Rorty's opposition to human solidarity based on reason is an opposition to reason as the essence of humanity and to the appeal of morality to reason rather than to concrete rational thought. The Copper Rule thus adds a touch of rationality to its conception, but not so much as to slip into the moral metaphysics that Rorty opposes.

6. Concluding

Rorty's idea of solidarity offers the possibility of moving towards human solidarity in terms of social progress, but it is sometimes fragile because it lacks philosophical roots and is too utopian to be realized because of the lack of concrete measures. Moreover, because of the environment in which they live, the idea of "us" and "them" is set up as a contrast between the strong and the weak, and there is a cultural need to avoid hegemonic tendencies.

Lawrence wilde argues that in practice communities are confronted with threats from other communities, real or imagined, and that the ideal of universal human solidarity is fragile. This reflects Rorty's sense of moral responsibility to society as an intellectual, his excessive trust in the liberal system, and his overconfidence in the intellectual class itself. The lack of willingness of others to be our justification. Rorty's call to abandon the notion of defining the meaning of our's life on the basis of capital truth, while depriving solidarity of its basis in truth, leads to a greater focus on the small meanings of everyday life.

Rorty takes ethnocentrism as a starting point in his discussion of the small community as "we", fully explaining the reasons for identifying with us, for the solidarity of humanity, still from the standpoint of the liberal, expressing the pursuit of the goals of liberal democracy and the pursuit of values such as diversity and pluralism in a democratic society as the common goal of people. Goals. These values are characteristic of the liberal democracy of the North Atlantic, of a free society, and do not necessarily correspond to the other. There is a need to maintain the autonomy of the other and to avoid leading to cultural hegemony.

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